There are few Congressmen from Tamil Nadu who have captured the corridors of power in Delhi as decisively as Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. Unfortunately for him, a powerful image in Delhi does not guarantee electoral success in his home state. His political predicament is reflected in his decision not to contest the parliamentary election from his home constituency of Sivaganga. It also demonstrates the abyss in which the Congress finds itself in Tamil Nadu.
On Thursday, when the Congress announced a list of 20 candidates for the state's 39 seats, Chidambaram's name was not on it. Instead, his son, Karti, will run from Sivaganga, the constituency his father has represented continuously since 1984, except for a loss in 1999, when he aligned with the breakaway Tamil Manila Congress and was defeated by the Congress candidate Sudarsana Nachiappan.
Chidambaram’s spin doctors have been saying that the politician wants the next generation to take charge. But there is one simple, undisputed fact. The Congress needs an alliance with one of the major Dravidian parties to win seats in Tamil Nadu. The party hoped that when push came to shove, the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam would yield to an alliance. But that was not to be.
The two sides walked away from each other in March 2013, ostensibly over the centre’s lack of support for Sri Lankan Tamils. Since then, they have had a blow-hot, blow-cold relationship but have not managed to get back together.
The rift between the two parties had simmered since the 2G scam related to the allocation of telecom spectrum erupted in 2010. DMK leader M Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi was arrested as a prime accused in 2011 along with former telecom minister A Raja, who also represents the party. Chidambaram was the finance minister in 2008 when the alleged scam took place. The DMK, insiders say, felt their leaders were “singled out” and the Congress “let them down”. The party was specifically angry with Chidambaram for not doing enough.
Till then, Chidambaram had shared a good personal rapport with Karunanidhi. The finance minister has been an opponent of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam leader J Jayalalithaa. In the 2009 elections, Chidambaram scraped through with a narrow and controversial victory over his AIADMK rival at Sivaganga. Many observers believe that the DMK pulled out all the stops to help him manage that win. But now, the new rivalry with the DMK rules out the possibility of even a tacit understanding with that party in Sivaganga, making things worse for the finance minister.
While that is a personal battle, in the larger picture, the DMK’s heir apparent MK Stalin was categorical that the party should not ally with the Congress. Insiders say that he felt it would be better for the party to test its strength alone rather than to ally with the Congress and part with winnable seats. The DMK also calculates that going it alone will give it greater space to maneuver after the elections.
The DMK’s decision exposes a much harsher reality for the Congress. The party lost power in the state to the DMK in 1967 and has never managed to regroup. It has played the role of a third force behind the two Dravidian parties (DMK and AIADMK) and has allied with one or the other, achieving the image of being the force that can tilt the balance of power. Especially between 1990 and 2006, an alliance with the Congress or its breakaway faction, the Tamil Manila Congress (which split from the Congress in 1996 but merged with it in 2002), was considered the key factor for success for the two Dravidian parties in the state.
However, since 2006, the Congress’s claim of being the third force has been diluted. Actor-turned-politician Vijayakanth’s Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam has occupied that space. In the 2011 assembly elections, he allied with J Jayalalithaa, giving her a mammoth victory. In that election, the Congress went with the DMK and was routed.
Given this situation, it seems clear why Chidambaram was wary of running. The mere fact that he and other Congress leaders have expressed reluctance to be candidates is a strong indictment of the party’s situation in 2014.
On Thursday, when the Congress announced a list of 20 candidates for the state's 39 seats, Chidambaram's name was not on it. Instead, his son, Karti, will run from Sivaganga, the constituency his father has represented continuously since 1984, except for a loss in 1999, when he aligned with the breakaway Tamil Manila Congress and was defeated by the Congress candidate Sudarsana Nachiappan.
Chidambaram’s spin doctors have been saying that the politician wants the next generation to take charge. But there is one simple, undisputed fact. The Congress needs an alliance with one of the major Dravidian parties to win seats in Tamil Nadu. The party hoped that when push came to shove, the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam would yield to an alliance. But that was not to be.
The two sides walked away from each other in March 2013, ostensibly over the centre’s lack of support for Sri Lankan Tamils. Since then, they have had a blow-hot, blow-cold relationship but have not managed to get back together.
The rift between the two parties had simmered since the 2G scam related to the allocation of telecom spectrum erupted in 2010. DMK leader M Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi was arrested as a prime accused in 2011 along with former telecom minister A Raja, who also represents the party. Chidambaram was the finance minister in 2008 when the alleged scam took place. The DMK, insiders say, felt their leaders were “singled out” and the Congress “let them down”. The party was specifically angry with Chidambaram for not doing enough.
Till then, Chidambaram had shared a good personal rapport with Karunanidhi. The finance minister has been an opponent of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam leader J Jayalalithaa. In the 2009 elections, Chidambaram scraped through with a narrow and controversial victory over his AIADMK rival at Sivaganga. Many observers believe that the DMK pulled out all the stops to help him manage that win. But now, the new rivalry with the DMK rules out the possibility of even a tacit understanding with that party in Sivaganga, making things worse for the finance minister.
While that is a personal battle, in the larger picture, the DMK’s heir apparent MK Stalin was categorical that the party should not ally with the Congress. Insiders say that he felt it would be better for the party to test its strength alone rather than to ally with the Congress and part with winnable seats. The DMK also calculates that going it alone will give it greater space to maneuver after the elections.
The DMK’s decision exposes a much harsher reality for the Congress. The party lost power in the state to the DMK in 1967 and has never managed to regroup. It has played the role of a third force behind the two Dravidian parties (DMK and AIADMK) and has allied with one or the other, achieving the image of being the force that can tilt the balance of power. Especially between 1990 and 2006, an alliance with the Congress or its breakaway faction, the Tamil Manila Congress (which split from the Congress in 1996 but merged with it in 2002), was considered the key factor for success for the two Dravidian parties in the state.
However, since 2006, the Congress’s claim of being the third force has been diluted. Actor-turned-politician Vijayakanth’s Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam has occupied that space. In the 2011 assembly elections, he allied with J Jayalalithaa, giving her a mammoth victory. In that election, the Congress went with the DMK and was routed.
Given this situation, it seems clear why Chidambaram was wary of running. The mere fact that he and other Congress leaders have expressed reluctance to be candidates is a strong indictment of the party’s situation in 2014.
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