A new book examines India’s federal weakening and aggressive centralisation of power

The more overt phase of centralisation in India unfolded with dramatic speed soon after the Bharatiya Janata Party returned to power in May 2019. On August 5 of that year, the Modi government stunned the nation and the world by revoking Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special constitutional status. Not only was this done without the consent of the State’s elected assembly (which was conveniently under President’s Rule), but the State was also split into two Union Territories – Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh – directly administered from Delhi. Though the move was hailed by some as the end of an outdated arrangement, scholars had long argued that the true federal autonomy promised by Article 370 had already been hollowed out over the decades, with successive governments – and at times the Supreme Court – systematically reducing it to a symbolic provision. The Modi government merely delivered the final blow.

But the centralising push didn’t end there. In December 2019, Parliament passed the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), which for the first time made religion a criterion for Indian citizenship – openly excluding Muslims from the list of persecuted minorities eligible for fast-tracked citizenship from select neighbouring countries. This marked a profound shift in the constitutional idea of secularism. Several opposition ruled State governments not only opposed the CAA but also refused to implement it and challenged it in the Supreme Court, asserting their right to resist what they saw as an unconstitutional law. Around the same time, the government passed the Triple Talaq Act, focusing specifically on Muslim personal law, and shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous verdict clearing the way for the construction of a Ram Temple at the site of the demolished Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. The temple was inaugurated in January 2024 with great fanfare – further signalling a Hindu majoritarian shift in the national narrative.

While these may seem like cultural or religious flashpoints more than federal issues, they speak volumes about a new model of centralised power that aims to redefine the Indian state itself.

The Modi government’s heavy-handed response to the Covid-19 pandemic, for example, saw sweeping emergency measures that left millions of migrant workers stranded, while States were barely consulted. Human rights activists were arrested and jailed under stringent anti-terror laws, and protests – like those against the CAA – were often met with brutal crackdowns. This aggressive posture from the Centre appeared to give a green light to BJP-ruled States to follow suit: a string of anti-“love jihad” laws, beef protection regulations, and other policies targeting minorities were passed at the State level, all mirroring the ideological thrust from Delhi. The message was clear – States were no longer co-equal units in a federation, but increasingly, instruments for extending the Centre’s political and ideological vision. In this unfolding reality, federalism wasn’t just being undermined; it was being completely re-scripted.

Following the time-tested and notorious formula used during the Indira Gandhi regime and its successor Janata Party regime, the Central government under Modi also attempted to apply President’s Rule in three opposition-ruled States – Maharashtra, Arunachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand – where defections or intra-party struggles offered opportunities to challenge the incumbent government’s authority in the State legislatures. In all three instances, however, the courts intervened to overturn the attempted imposition. It is in the fourth instance of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir that several other Constitutional mandates have come under stress in recent years. The Centre imposed its rule in the State in 2017 itself when the Mehbooba Mufti government lost its majority following the withdrawal of support from the BJP.

On top of all this, recent years have also seen frequent clashes between State governments and their Governors (who are centrally appointed), adding yet another layer to the growing rift between the Centre and the States.

As legal scholar Faizan Mustafa notes, “It appears that Governors appointed by the current government have gone far beyond their counterparts appointed by earlier dispensations in making elected State governments non-functional. There has been a tug-of-war over multiple issues – the appointment of vice-chancellors, nominations to State legislative councils, the editing of the customary address by the Governor and the summoning of the House. Add to the list the delay or denial of assent to bills passed by legislative assemblies.”

Confrontations between State governments and Governors escalated after Narendra Modi began his second tenure as Prime Minister in 2019. Governments in West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Kerala and Punjab were particularly upset as their Governors took inordinately long to assent to bills passed by their legislative assemblies. Punjab, Kerala and Tamil Nadu knocked on the Supreme Court’s door around the same time, complaining about pending bills, some as old as three years, drawing sharp comments from Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud. When Governors subsequently cleared a few and pushed the others upstairs to the President for assent barely days before the hearings, they drew further adverse comments from the bench. Even as the hearings continued, the Supreme Court, while agreeing to Kerala’s demands to frame guidelines in this regard, gave a crucial verdict on the Punjab government’s plea. The court’s verdict on Punjab said Governors must act within the four corners of the State legislature without flexing a non-existent veto power over bills. The bench later advised the Kerala Governor to read up the Punjab judgment and act accordingly.

The most recent Supreme Court ruling in the Tamil Nadu vs Governor case marks a strong reaffirmation of federal principles in India. The court made it clear that Governors do not have unchecked discretion under Article 200 when it comes to giving assent to bills passed by State legislatures. Justice JB Pardiwala’s judgment introduced clear time limits for Governors to either assent, return, or reserve a bill for the President, effectively curbing prolonged delays. This decision pushes back against the misuse of gubernatorial powers and reinforces the role of elected State governments. The Tamil Nadu Governor’s move to delay assent and refer ten bills to the President after months of inaction was deemed arbitrary and unconstitutional. The verdict also reminded Governors, bound by Article 159, that their duty was to uphold the Constitution – not override democratic processes. It is interesting to go back to the constitutional history of how this position was established.

At the time of India’s independence, there was a broad consensus among the country’s leaders that Governors should be impartial figures, not political appointees. Jawaharlal Nehru preferred to appoint respected academics and neutral individuals from various fields. BN Rau, the constitutional advisor, even suggested that Governors be elected by provincial legislatures through a secret ballot. Sardar Patel went a step further, recommending direct election by the people and the possibility of impeachment for misconduct. Eventually, BR Ambedkar concluded that since Governors were intended to be ceremonial heads, there was no need for expensive elections. He said that Governors would not be agents of the Centre but representatives of the State’s people, and that chief ministers would always be consulted in their appointment. TT Krishnamachari, in fact, claimed that the chief minister concerned would effectively have a veto over the choice. Later, the Sarkaria Commission echoed these views, suggesting the involvement of the Vice President and the Lok Sabha Speaker in the selection process. However, in practice, successive Central governments have ignored these recommendations, often ending up using Governors as their proxy messengers. And this practice of constant misuse of the gubernatorial office has increased, leading to acute constitutional crises, forcing the apex court to intervene repeatedly

Excerpted with permission from Federalism Making and Unmaking a Union of States, Avinash Kumar, Speaking Tiger Books.