Pakistan has moved decisively to internationalise India’s decision to keep the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. In the last week of April, Islamabad took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, shifting the dispute from a bilateral argument to a test of international law, treaty obligation and institutional credibility.
Pakistan has urged the Security Council to take urgent action against India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, calling the move illegal and warning that it could trigger serious security, environmental, and humanitarian consequences for millions of people.
What New Delhi framed as a sovereign response to security concerns is now being scrutinised in a multilateral forum. That shift matters. It exposes the Modi government’s move not as a tactical pressure point, but as a step that sits uneasily with the treaty, with the authority of the World Bank as a co signatory, and with the broader norms that govern shared rivers.
The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 has long been regarded as one of the most resilient water sharing agreements in the world. It survived wars, military actions and prolonged hostility between India and Pakistan. Its durability rested on a carefully designed institutional framework that insulated water sharing from political volatility.
By placing the treaty in abeyance, India has broken from that logic. It has signaled that even a robust international agreement can be set aside when political expediency demands it. That is a dangerous precedent, not just for South Asia, but for a world where shared rivers are becoming increasingly contested.
Pakistan’s response has been strategic. By approaching the Security Council and mobilising diplomatic support, Islamabad is reframing the issue as one of international concern. This is not merely about river flows. It is about the sanctity of treaties and the role of international institutions. The World Bank helped broker the treaty and remains a co-signatory. By keeping the treaty in abeyance, India is not only challenging Pakistan. It is also going against an international institutional arrangement that New Delhi itself accepted. If one party can unilaterally suspend compliance, it weakens both the treaty and the credibility of the institution that helped guarantee it.
This is why Pakistan’s argument is gaining diplomatic traction. It taps into a broader concern about the erosion of international norms and the sidelining of multilateral frameworks. India has long projected itself as a responsible power that respects rules, agreements and institutions. Its current posture on the Indus Waters Treaty weakens that claim. A country cannot defend rule-based order when convenient and disregard it when domestic politics demands a show of toughness.
What makes this moment particularly difficult for India is the changing diplomatic landscape. Pakistan’s international standing has improved in recent months, most notably after its role in facilitating a ceasefire understanding between the United States and Iran. That episode enhanced Islamabad’s image as a useful diplomatic actor capable of engaging major powers. As a result, Pakistan enters this dispute with a stronger hand than it has held in years. It is no longer isolated or easily dismissed.
Both China and the United States, despite their rivalry, appear more receptive to Pakistan’s position than India might have anticipated. Beijing’s support is expected, given its strategic alignment with Islamabad. Washington’s posture is more consequential. The United States has traditionally tried to balance its ties with India and Pakistan, yet its recent engagement with Pakistan, along with President Donald Trump’s open admiration for Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir, suggests a willingness to view Islamabad as a partner in regional stability. This convergence, however limited, creates a challenging environment for India at the Security Council. Even if no formal resolution emerges, the optics of scrutiny carry their own costs.
India’s legal position is also weak. The Indus Waters Treaty does not provide for unilateral suspension. The World Bank has already made it clear since last year. It is a binding agreement that lays out mechanisms for dispute resolution, including neutral experts and arbitration. By bypassing these mechanisms, India risks being seen as acting outside the very framework it once championed. More importantly, by sidelining a treaty in which the World Bank is a co signatory, India is undermining an international arrangement that gave the agreement legitimacy and durability. This raises uncomfortable questions about its commitment to treaty-based governance and multilateralism.
At the same time, the practical benefits of keeping the treaty in abeyance are limited. The idea that India can significantly alter water flows to Pakistan in the short term is overstated. The infrastructure required to divert or store large volumes of water is not in place. Even where India has some flexibility within the treaty, the scope for immediate impact is modest. What India can do is create uncertainty and anxiety, especially during the dry season when water scarcity becomes acute. But uncertainty is not the same as strategic gain.
For Pakistan, the risks are real. Reduced flows or delayed releases can affect agriculture, energy generation and livelihoods. Yet these pressures are unlikely to force political concessions. Instead, they strengthen Pakistan’s incentive to escalate the issue diplomatically. By internationalising the dispute, Islamabad seeks to offset its vulnerabilities on the ground with leverage in global forums. In that sense, India’s move has backfired by giving Pakistan an opportunity to recast the narrative.
The ripple effects extend beyond Pakistan. Bangladesh will be watching closely. The Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh, signed for thirty years, is coming to an end at the close of this year. That agreement has been central to water sharing between the two countries. If India is seen as willing to place a major river treaty in abeyance with one neighbor, Dhaka will naturally worry about the reliability of its own arrangement. Trust, once eroded in one basin, is difficult to sustain in another.
For Bangladesh, water security is tied to agriculture, livelihoods, ecology and national vulnerability. Any uncertainty about upstream behavior is alarming. India’s current approach risks injecting doubt into a relationship that will soon require confidence and cooperation for renewal or renegotiation of the Ganges treaty. The message from the Indus basin is therefore far from reassuring.
The situation in Kashmir adds another layer of complexity. The Modi government has often framed water as a tool for development in Indian administered Kashmir, arguing that greater control over the Indus system could benefit local people. But keeping the treaty in abeyance does not automatically produce development. Large projects require time, money, peace and stability. The region remains caught in a larger geopolitical contest, and water alone cannot resolve its political problems. The promise of immediate gains is difficult to sustain.
More broadly, India’s decision risks undermining its long-term interests. As a lower riparian in other river systems, India has historically benefited from norms of equitable use, restraint and binding agreements. By setting a precedent of unilateral action, it weakens the very principles that protect its position elsewhere, including in the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin. This is a classic case of short-term tactics clashing with long term strategy.
The timing could not be worse. Climate change is already altering the hydrology of the Indus basin. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons and rising temperatures are making river flows less predictable. In such a context, cooperation is not a luxury. It is a necessity. The treaty, despite its limitations, provides a mechanism for communication and coordination. Suspending it removes precisely the safeguards that both countries need most.
The Modi government now faces a difficult choice. It can persist with a policy that yields limited practical benefits while incurring growing diplomatic and legal costs. Or it can seek a way back to the treaty framework and use existing mechanisms to address its concerns. The latter path is not weakness. It is strategic prudence. The current moment calls for restraint, dialogue and a return to the principles that kept the waters flowing despite decades of discord.
Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research and UNESCO Chair of International Water Cooperation at Uppsala University, Sweden.
You’ve read Scroll.
Now help sustain it
Scroll is funded by readers, not corporate owners. If you believe our work matters, support our newsroom. Become a member today!
We’re not driven by clicks or corporate interests – just honest, independent reporting. Keep us going. Support Scroll today!