A new book examines Donald Trump’s Afghanistan strategy and how it deepened faultlines in South Asia

Rolling out his new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia on August 21, 2017, Trump shared three core American interests. The first was an “honourable and enduring outcome” of the war in Afghanistan, which could be described as a “victory” worthy of the tremendous sacrifices made by US military personnel. The second was not to create a vacuum in Afghanistan through a “hasty withdrawal”, which could be filled by Al Qaeda and ISIS, “as had happened before 9/11”. Trump gave the example of the total withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in December 2011, which subsequently allowed ISIS to grow in the region. The third was to eliminate the ‘immense security threat’ to the US stemming from Afghanistan and the broader region.

Though the broad strategy remained the same, Trump made one significant shift with regard to the timetable for the withdrawal of US troops. Instead of time-based withdrawal, he announced that it would be condition-based. Under the new strategy, the number of troops and operational details would not be shared. Clarifying that the US was not in Afghanistan for “nation building”, Trump pledged support to the ANDSF and to the Afghan government to lead the peace talks with the Taliban.

He warned Pakistan that the US would no longer remain silent about the safe haven it was providing to terror groups, and that Pakistan could gain much more by cooperating with the US. Pakistan, he said, had been “paid billions of dollars” even though it had sheltered the same groups trying to kill US troops each day. Pledging additional troops and funding, Trump warned that the US support to Afghanistan was not a “blank cheque” and US “patience was not unlimited”. These words turned out to be prophetic as became apparent in August 2021.

When Trump took over the US presidency in January 2017, the ISIS threat was still serious, but by the middle of 2018, the US-led coalition was succeeding against the Caliphate. The Syrian regime, supported by Russia and Iran, too, had contributed by snatching back territory from ISIS in Syria. The last bastion of the Caliphate, Baghouz in Syria, fell on March 23, 2019, and Trump declared victory against ISIS. The first Caliph, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, was killed in a raid by US special forces in the Idlib province of Syria on October 27, 2019. This significantly weakened the global threat of ISIS.

During the period of active combat against ISIS, the US could not take the risk of hastily leaving Afghanistan and creating a vacuum for ISIS to grow its footprints there. However, since Trump was not interested in nation-building, his counter-terrorism goals were clear. These operations continued in the backdrop of the overall strategy of supporting the Afghan government and the ANDSF. Trump continued to push the Afghan government on reconciliation efforts with the Taliban. By declaring condition-based withdrawal of US troops in August 2017, he had given the initiative back to the Ghani government.

The talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban did not happen amidst heavy fighting. Trump appointed Afghan-American career diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad as the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) on September 21, 2018. He had previously served as US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003–05 and US Ambassador to Iraq from 2005–07. Under his initiative, the US took a lead in carrying out talks for reconciliation with the Taliban and the Afghan government separately.

By October 2018, the US had managed to get one of the last surviving founder-leaders of the Taliban, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, released from Pakistan’s custody. Pakistan had arrested him in Karachi in 2010, while he was reportedly involved in the peace talks with the Afghan government.

It is widely believed that by putting Pakistan on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, the US was able to build pressure on Pakistan to release Baradar and secure a “free hand” in holding direct talks with him and other senior Taliban leaders. Baradar’s standing amongst Taliban cadres was very high and he was virtually seen as the number two after the then “elusive” AuM Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada.

Following the killing of his predecessor, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, in a US drone strike in Balochistan, Pakistan, in May 2016, Akhundzada had maintained a low profile somewhere in Pakistan. Mansoor had been anointed as AuM after the news of the death of Mullah Omar surfaced in 2015. The media reported that Mullah Omar had died of illness in Pakistan in 2013, but it was kept a secret. No successor was anointed until the news became public in 2015.

Under Baradar, the political office of the Taliban in Doha became active and several countries began reaching out to the Taliban. This was a period when countries including Russia, China and Iran established direct, visible contacts with the Taliban leadership through the Doha outreach. The Americans welcomed such moves to create greater acceptance of a peace process involving the Taliban. The Afghan government and key politicians still seemed reluctant to make use of the opportunity to build bridges with the reconcilable Taliban. This proved to be a costly mistake.

The June 2019 DOD report (December 1, 2018–May 31, 2019) on Afghanistan provided a good overview of developments at this stage. Judged against the three core interests Trump had outlined in August 2017, it suggested that the only interest left to be achieved was to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for “groups” that could plan attacks against the US.

On the peace process, the report recorded that under “Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the SRAR remains engaged in talks with the Taliban to achieve a peace agreement that safeguards the US homeland and could lead to a reduction in the number of US forces deployed in Afghanistan. As the SRAR has stated, any comprehensive peace agreement will be made up of four interconnected parts: counterterrorism assurances; troop withdrawal; intra-Afghan negotiations that lead to a political settlement; and a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire”.

The report mentioned that the ANDSF bore the brunt of fighting in Afghanistan but were continuing to improve their ability to fight insurgents. Both the ANDSF and international forces were focused on countering the Taliban and groups like ISIS-K. The assessment said that despite losses, the ‘ISIS-K had made territorial gains in eastern Afghanistan’ and the ‘Al Qaeda maintained an enduring interest in attacking US forces and Western targets’. Here, the reference to eastern Afghanistan was to rugged, far-flung areas such as those in Kunar province that the foreign and Afghan forces found difficult to police.

However, the DOD assessment on the Al Qaeda threat painted an encouraging picture. As per the report, “Al Qaeda poses a very limited threat to US personnel and our partners in Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda affiliate – Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) – poses a greater threat to those elements. AQIS routinely supports and works with low-level Taliban in its efforts to undermine the Afghan Government, and maintains an enduring interest in attacking US forces and Western targets in the region…The few remaining Al Qaeda personnel focus largely on survival, while ceding Al Qaeda regional presence to AQIS…continuing Coalition counter terrorism pressure has reduced AQIS’s ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan”.

This practically meant that the threat of Al Qaeda emanating from the region was “under control” by June 2019. The Caliphate was gone and the global threat of ISIS, too, had reduced considerably. Besides, the Taliban had started local operations against ISIS-K elements in Afghanistan. The ANDSF, too, was chasing them. The ISIS-K was never a big group and initially comprised former mid to low-level elements of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, who were locals. Their areas of operation were mainly confined to the border region, especially in pockets of Kunar and Nangarhar provinces.

Despite this positive outlook, the report suggested that the DOD had a clear-eyed view that maintaining a robust counterterrorism capability in the foreseeable future was essential for this region. The ANDSF was identified as the central player for this task. It stated unequivocally that “our strategy in Afghanistan is conditions-based; our commanders on the ground continually evaluate the current conditions and make recommendations on appropriate force levels”.

Excerpted with permission from Glocal Terror in South Asia: Tracing the Roots in Geopolitics and the Tragedy of Afghanistan, Anju Gupta, Simon and Schuster India.