Maharashtra ends illegal control over forest produce, but is uncomfortable with Adivasi autonomy

In November, Maharashtra issued two government resolutions restoring the authority of gram sabhas to grant transit permits for minor forest produce.

This formally ends more than a decade of the Forest Department’s control over bamboo, tendu leaves and other forest resources, which are gathered primarily by Adivasi residents for nutrition or sold for a seasonal income.

The resolutions are a long-overdue correction under the Forest Rights Act and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act. Sections 3(1)(g), Rule 2(1)(d), and Rule 4(1)(ch) of the Forest Rights Act explicitly vest ownership of minor forest produce and transport- sanctioning powers with the gram sabhas. The previous mechanism clearly violated these statutory provisions.

But now, as Adivasi communities in Gadchiroli have begun examining how these government resolutions are being interpreted and implemented, an uncomfortable reality is emerging. Decentralisation is being restored in name even as operational control risks being rerouted through new administrative pathways without institutional support for gram sabhas.

This development reflects how India has yet to meaningfully engage with what autonomy for Adivasi communities entails: not merely as a constitutional promise, but as a lived, political reality shaped by distinct histories, institutions and collective modes of governance.

Recognition without institutionalisation

The first government resolution, dated November 13, annuls the 2013 and 2015 Government Resolutions issued by the Revenue and Forest Department, through which the Forest Department was vested with authority over the issuance of transit permits.

The resolution anchors this reversal in the Forest Rights Act and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, both of which clearly recognise gram sabhas as the primary authority over ownership, collection, transportation, and sale of minor forest produce in Scheduled Areas.

Transit permits are not a mere technical formality. They determine whether forest produce can move from the site of collection to markets, and thus directly shape pricing, timing, and bargaining power. Control over transit permits is control over livelihoods.

Until the 2025 government resolutions, the Forest Department heavily controlled minor forest produce governance in Maharashtra. Permits were often delayed or inconsistently issued, forcing Adivasi collectors to make repeated visits to forest offices, engage intermediaries or negotiate informally to transport produce harvested from their own forests.

Community members reported during conversations with the authors in Gadchiroli in late November that substantial informal payments sometimes amounting to nearly Rs 1 lakh were demanded in connection with permits, deepening economic vulnerability.

Livelihood activities were rendered inefficient and, at times, loss-making through bureaucratic control. Prolonged waiting periods reduced bamboo quality and market value. Similar losses were reported in tendu leaves, where prices are highly time-sensitive.

Since 2006, the Forest Rights Act has vested control over minor forest produce in gram sabhas. The 2025 government resolution that withdrew this illegal administrative usurpation followed sustained assertion by Adivasi communities.

In Gadchiroli, several gram sabhas began issuing their own transit permits, triggering administrative pushback, including seizures at check-posts. In June 2021, when the Waghezari Gram Sabha attempted to transport 1,323 sacks of tendu leaves worth Rs 63.79 lakh, their vehicles were seized for several days.

Through gram sabha resolutions, written representations, and collective engagement with the administration, communities forced the state to acknowledge rights already being exercised on the ground – often at significant collective risk.

Procedure without support

The second government resolution, dated November 27, lays down the procedural framework to implement this restored authority. Gram sabhas are required to print, issue and regulate transit permits using prescribed formats, serial numbers, colour codes, and registers.

They must maintain detailed records, share permit information with forest offices and oversee all movement of produce, including inter-district and inter-state transport.

The resolution also allows gram sabhas to authorise individuals, “institutions/organisations” or “federations” to transport minor forest produce. These categories remain undefined, creating space for interpretive ambiguity and future contestation – particularly in contexts where cooperatives, NGOs or traders may seek to re-enter governance spaces meant to remain community-controlled.

What is also striking are the omissions in the two government resolutions. While procedural expectations are elaborated in detail, there is no framework for capacity-building, legal education, financial support or administrative training for gram sabhas.

Subjects, not right-holders

The trajectory of the governance of minor forest produce in Maharashtra reflects a continuity with colonial forest administration. For years, Forest Department control over transit permits functioned as an assertion of authority over communities treated as subjects rather than constitutional rights-holders.

Meaningful autonomy requires sustained institutional support, particularly for communities historically excluded from formal governance systems. Yet, nearly two decades after the passage of the Forest Rights Act, the state has not invested in large-scale legal literacy or systematic capacity-building of gram sabhas.

Nitin Pada, from Paydi village in Gadchiroli, in a telephone conversation with the authors in December, observed that Adivasis trained themselves to understand PESA and the Forest Rights Act. “We learned by sitting with elders and leaders like Hiraman Warkhade, who taught us these laws,” said Pada. “We used to carry rice and other essentials as a gesture of respect for his efforts.”

In the absence of support, communities recognise that institutional gaps create openings for external actors to intervene and undermine gram sabha authority through dependency rather than coercion.

Intermediary capture, state re-appropriation

Transferring a complex administrative and commercial apparatus to gram sabhas without infrastructure or support creates a governance vacuum, which is rarely neutral. This space is quickly occupied by private intermediaries and the state itself through reinterpretation and procedural re-appropriation.

Community members report that contractors have already printed transit permit books and are approaching gram sabhas for approval, revealing how swiftly procedural control can migrate to actors with capital and bureaucratic familiarity. Formal authority may remain with the gram sabha, but control over documentation, logistics and negotiations begins to shift outward.

This risk is intensified by the government resolution’s vague authorisation of “institutions” and “organisations”. Tribal leader Devaji Tofa from Mendha Lekha cautioned against introducing undefined external entities into a constitutionally-protected governance framework, since it risks reopening spaces for interference that the Forest Rights Act and PESA were meant to close.

More troublingly, in meetings with the Gadchiroli administration, community representatives were reportedly told that bodies such as the zilla parishad or panchayat samiti could be treated as “organisations” for managing permits, despite no such provision in the government resolution. This interpretation violates the logic of decentralisation. Instead of transferring authority to communities, it is redistributed within the state.

Adivasi constitutional assertion

In response, gram sabhas in Gadchiroli have begun organising collectively. They have formed a district-level forum called the Gaon Gan Rajya Gram Sabha Parishad to coordinate permit printing and support villages with weaker institutional capacity. It is collective self-defence against the displacement of authority.

Such collective organisation reflects long-standing Adivasi governance structures, historically operating across village, ilaka (territorial) and regional levels. Yet, when articulated within contemporary governance frameworks, these institutions are met with suspicion.

As Pada notes, the administration has refused to recognise the collective unless it is formally registered, thus privileging bureaucratic form over constitutional substance. This insistence blocks Adivasi institutions while enabling state and private actors to operate with ease.

It reveals a deeper discomfort with Adivasi constitutional assertion. The state continues to approach Adivasi self-governance as a problem to be managed rather than as constitutional authority to be respected.

Way forward

A constitutional reorientation is required. Gram sabhas must be recognised as constitutional actors whose authority flows directly from law. This demands a sustained orientation of the bureaucracy grounded in Adivasi histories, institutions and leadership – not generic decentralisation templates.

Equally essential is the recognition of Adivasi institutional forms on their own terms. Decentralisation without institutional backing becomes a transfer of responsibility without power.

Without trust in Adivasi constitutional authority, decentralisation will merely reproduce control in fragmented administrative forms rather than realise genuine self-governance.

Bodhi Ramteke is a lawyer, researcher, and Erasmus Mundus Scholar, currently practising at the Bombay High Court. His email ID is bodhi.ramteke@opendeusto.es.

Ravindra Chunarkar is a forest governance researcher and founder of Van Swaraj. His email ID is ravindrachunarkar95@gmail.com.