What the revival of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties means for India

The military confrontation between India and Pakistan in May has sharpened New Delhi’s anxieties about its neighborhood. Understandably, strategic experts have been preoccupied with the tightening China-Pakistan nexus, which presents the most direct and immediate threat to India.

But in the process, an equally consequential development is at risk of being overlooked: the revival of Bangladesh’s relationship with Pakistan, a nation from which it had waged a bloody independence struggle. What began as tentative outreach late in 2024 has, in less than a year, developed into a serious political, economic, and now military partnership. If sustained, this rapprochement could create new and enduring vulnerabilities for India’s national security.

The political shift in Dhaka in August 2024 marked a decisive break from the past. Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League had for 15 years cultivated close ties with India, aligning Bangladesh’s policies with New Delhi’s regional and security concerns. Hasina’s exile in India following the mass protests that toppled her regime soured relations.

The interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has consciously recalibrated foreign policy, reaching out to previously estranged partners. Pakistan has been the most enthusiastic suitor, moving quickly to seize the opportunity that Hasina’s departure created.

India must accept part of the blame for this drift. The Narendra Modi government pursued a narrow, personality-driven policy toward Bangladesh, putting all of New Delhi’s eggs in Sheikh Hasina’s basket. The strategy delivered dividends while she remained in power: border security cooperation, transit to the North East, the suppression of anti-India militants.

But it left India dangerously exposed once Hasina was toppled. By tying its fortunes so closely to one leader and neglecting wider political and societal outreach in Bangladesh, New Delhi allowed resentment to grow unchecked. The result is that India now finds itself isolated in Dhaka, watching as others rush in to fill the vacuum.

Within six months of the transition, Yunus met Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif twice, even before holding any bilateral meetings with Narendra Modi. Pakistani diplomats in Dhaka have worked tirelessly to expand relations, while cultural exchanges, resumed maritime trade, relaxed visa regimes, and scholarships for Bangladeshi students have created new channels of contact.

The symbolism has been deliberate. In December, singer Rahat Fateh Ali Khan performed to capacity crowds in Dhaka, while cargo vessels from Karachi and Gwadar unloaded at Chittagong port for the first time since the 1971 war.

These gestures are not merely cultural or economic. They are a carefully orchestrated effort by Islamabad to normalise its presence in Bangladesh and turn the page on decades of bitterness.

Yet history has not vanished. The memory of the Liberation War and the mass atrocities of 1971 remains embedded in Bangladesh’s collective consciousness. The Awami League long leveraged this memory to mobilise support against Pakistan, particularly through the war crimes tribunal that prosecuted Islamist leaders accused of collaboration. Pakistan’s refusal to apologise continues to cast a long shadow.

Many Bangladeshis remain sceptical about rapprochement, wary of any diplomatic embrace that could look like absolution. But even as historical wounds linger, pragmatism is reshaping state policy in Dhaka.

Trade has been the most immediate driver. Bilateral trade continues to rise exponentially, with both sides working to diversify exchanges beyond textiles and raw materials to include food products, construction materials, IT and pharmaceuticals. A joint business council was launched in January.

Sea connectivity has resumed and direct flights may soon follow. These moves carry clear political symbolism, but their strategic consequences become evident in the sphere of defense.

The most significant change since Hasina’s ouster has been the revival of military-to-military contacts. In January, senior officials from the two armed forces met in Rawalpindi to discuss joint training, exercises, and arms cooperation. Bangladesh has shown interest in acquiring JF-17 fighter jets, the Pakistan-China co-produced aircraft that has become the mainstay of Islamabad’s air force.

This aligns with Bangladesh’s “Forces Goal 2030”, its ambitious military modernisation programme. For India, the prospect of Dhaka sourcing advanced combat aircraft, not from the West or Russia as in the past, but from Islamabad and Beijing, is an unmistakable warning. The consequences go beyond the procurement of weapons. Defense cooperation builds habits of coordination, creates interoperability and fosters trust between militaries.

If Dhaka and Islamabad institutionalise such links, New Delhi would face the grim prospect of adversarial forces gaining leverage on both its western and eastern borders.

The echoes of history make this more alarming. During the 1960s, when Bangladesh was still East Pakistan, Pakistani intelligence and military facilities there were used to provide sanctuary and training to insurgents in India’s North East. The Mizo and Naga rebellions were fed by networks that operated out of East Pakistan with the support of Islamabad’s Inter-Services Intelligence.

India’s eventual ability to bring stability to the region owed much to Hasina’s cooperation in the 2010s and 2020s, which included cracking down on cross-border insurgent sanctuaries and intelligence sharing. That hard-won stability now risks being undone if Bangladesh establishes a security relationship with Pakistan.

China’s role deepens the danger. Beijing is the largest arms supplier to both Bangladesh and Pakistan and has already woven each country into its Belt and Road Initiative. The emerging pattern suggests that China sees a geopolitical opportunity to recreate, in a new form, the old axis of the 1960s: Beijing, Islamabad and Dhaka converging against India.

Their trilateral meeting in Kunming in June, even if not institutionalised, symbolised this possibility. Though Dhaka continues to say that it will not join blocs or formal alliances, its participation in Pakistan-led naval drills and its exploration of Chinese-Pakistani fighter jets point to an unmistakable drift.

The pace of this rapprochement was underscored by the visit of Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to Dhaka this week. Dar’s agenda is not limited to ceremonial diplomacy,. The countries have signed six agreements and MoUs aimed at enhancing cooperation in trade, diplomacy, media and education. Pakistan is giving 500 scholarships to Bangladeshi students.

Dar also met with former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and senior figures from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which opinion polls suggest is well placed to return to power in the elections due in early 2026.

For Pakistan, cultivating ties with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party is strategic insurance. For India, it signals that whichever way Bangladesh’s politics tilt, Islamabad is preparing for long-term engagement with Dhaka’s future leadership.

The apprehensions of the Indian Army are not unfounded. General Anil Chauhan, India’s chief of defense staff, has already warned that the emerging convergence of interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh could disrupt the regional balance of power. Strategic encirclement is no longer a theoretical risk but a lived anxiety.

Unlike in the past, India cannot count on emotional solidarity with Bangladesh rooted in 1971 or the Awami League’s loyalty. Politics in Dhaka is fluid, polarised and transactional. A caretaker administration seeking legitimacy and autonomy is less beholden to India’s concerns. Elections in 2026 may alter the course again but the direction of travel is evident: Bangladesh is opening itself to new partners and Pakistan has rushed in to occupy that space.

For India, the implications are serious. At the very least, the warming of Dhaka-Islamabad relations dilutes New Delhi’s influence in South Asia and weakens its ability to project stability in the Bay of Bengal and the North East. At worst, it risks reviving old patterns of proxy conflict, where Pakistani intelligence leverages Bangladeshi territory to stir unrest in India’s North East.

Combined with China’s growing infrastructure footprint in Chittagong and Sylhet, this could trap India in a two-and-a-half front dilemma: military pressure from Pakistan, strategic rivalry with China and sub-conventional instability spilling from Bangladesh.

India cannot afford complacency. The Modi government’s overreliance on Sheikh Hasina has backfired, leaving New Delhi blindsided by Dhaka’s rapid pivot. What is needed now is a course correction: broad-based outreach beyond one party or leader, economic and cultural initiatives that connect with ordinary Bangladeshis, and quiet but sustained re-engagement with all political actors, including the Bangladesh National Party.

India must demonstrate that partnership with New Delhi is more rewarding than hedging with Islamabad and Beijing. Otherwise, old enemies becoming new friends could soon mean that India is encircled by rivals not just in the west and north, but also across its vulnerable eastern flank. That would mark not only a failure of diplomacy but a profound strategic setback.

Ashok Swain is a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, Sweden.