Around 2010 and 2011, the Malaysian government’s five-year electoral mandate was to conclude in barely two years and PM Najib was weighing his options. Najib could either call for snap polls, or sit out the full term and dissolve parliament after the first quarter of 2013. Whatever the timing, his party and coalition government would need large amounts of funding for the political campaign.
Within the Najib camp, all eyes turned to Jho Low. He was barely 29 and already impressing Najib by displaying the traits of a seasoned scheme artist. Apart from his unique ability to compartmentalise and juggle various financial manoeuvres, Low was soft-spoken, never mercurial even in the most tense of moments, and always understated in private encounters. His other side was his extravagant tastes, and a proclivity to throw lavish parties that drew the attention of the tabloids in New York.
Amid all of this, Low was locking the Najib government and the Malaysian people into the largest-ever debt commitment entered into by any administration since independence in 1957. He held no position in any government agency. He had no official advisory role at 1MDB. While those outside Najib's circle, particularly Mahathir Mohamed's clique of cronies, began to view Low with a mix of envy and concern, there was nothing but admiration for Low as far as PM Najib was concerned. He may be “rough around the edges”, Najib remarked to one of his aides (the late Datuk Azlin Alias, who died in a helicopter crash in April 2015 that also claimed the life of senior UMNO man Jamaluddin Jarjis). Najib was suggesting that Low was sometimes reckless, but nevertheless his personal financial buccaneer.
Najib assigned all duties to Low when it came to bringing back the 1MDB-related funds that had been spirited away to offshore accounts. Low quickly began discussions with AmBank’s Cheah and central bank governor Zeti on how to proceed. The first hurdle was coming up, requiring a narrative that would make the inflow of huge amounts of siphoned funds appear kosher. A grand subterfuge was necessary for Cheah to go along with the plan, and for Zeti to clear the regulatory path. Low suggested a plan by which AmBank would get notifications that Najib was expected to receive large funds from a senior member of the ruling family of Saudi Arabia. Letters from the highest levels of the Saudi government would be furnished to support the plan and this would get funds into Malaysia without encountering any regulatory obstacles.
The first letter, dated 1 February 2011, on the letterhead of the Private Office of Saud Abdulaziz Al Saud’ was titled “Recognition of Contribution to The Islamic World” and it waxed lyrical about Najib. It read:
I have been following your work recently and I am impressed with the work that you have done to govern Malaysia using Islamic principles and how you are reintroducing Islam to the rest of the world in view of the current perception that many people have since 9/11 ... In view of the friendship that we have developed over the years and your new ideas as a modern Islamic leader, I hereby grant you a sum of United States Dollars One Hundred Million (USD100,000,000) Only (“Gift”) which shall be remitted to you at such times and in such manner as I deem fit. You shall have absolute discretion to determine how the Gift shall be utilised and I am confident that your actions will continue to promote Islam so it continues to flourish. This is merely a small gesture on my part but it is my way of contributing to the development of Islam to the world.
In a kingdom never short of princelings, there appears to be very little evidence of fact-checking by AmBank on the true identity of Prince Saud Abdulaziz. The letter should have also appeared incredulous to any seasoned banker.
But that did not stop Cheah from leaning heavily on the dispatch to shoot off a note to Zeti on 9 February 2011, eight days from the date of the letter. His note to Negara governor Zeti stated that, “Further to our brief conversation, I would like to advise that the designated account... for the expected remittances would be ‘AmPrivate Banking – MR’?” It was by all accounts a stealth operation. The account was structured to ensure maximum confidentiality, even among senior members of the bank's top management, by attaching a unique internal coding and tagging. The prefix Am represented a loophole that puts the activities of the account outside AmBank's own compliance system, while “MR” was the code reference for Mr Razak.
At this point, it is unclear how many people Cheah brought into the loop for Najib’s account with AmBank. But Cheah knew that having Najib as a client would likely become an issue and Cheah’s big conundrum was, at what point should he bring AmBank’s foreign shareholder, Australian banking group ANZ, into the picture. He decided not to delay the matter and quickly reached out to his ANZ counterpart, Ashok Ramamurthy, who had previously been chief financial officer (CFO) at AmBank. Cheah informed ANZ’s chief representative in Malaysia that Najib had decided to set up a personal account with the bank and that approval had been obtained from Negara.
Ashok, a native of India who had migrated to New Zealand in 1988 before taking a senior position at ANZ, was taken aback by the disclosure. He asked Cheah why the PM had chosen AmBank and not a state-controlled financial institution, such as Maybank or CIMB, which was headed by Najib’s younger brother, Nazir. Cheah responded that since the request came from the PM, he could not say “no”, and went on to add that Najib was expected to receive donations from overseas parties. Ashok, who had doubled as both CFO and deputy group managing director of AmBank, became uneasy but did not pursue the matter further with Cheah.
Along with his other ANZ colleagues, Ashok was more than curious about Cheah’s access to the PM, which was an invaluable connection when doing business in a country like Malaysia. Cheah, a pudgy man with a slow gait and easy smile, had studied economics at the University of Malaya and, before joining AmBank, had worked at a government agency set up specially to attract foreign direct investments into the country. Despite his long years at AmBank, Cheah was never a high-profile banker desiring media attention like many of his contemporaries. But after snaring the 1MDB deal, Cheah felt that a little self-promotion would not hurt.
He never downplayed his access to Najib, which everyone at AmBank knew was through Low. He would often slip into private conversations with his heads of department that, among “AmBank’s board of directors, I have the best access to the prime minister”.
Excerpted with permission from The Siege Within, Leslie Lopez, Penguin Random House SEA.
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