Explained: How Supreme Court kicked the can of AMU’s minority status down the road

On his last working day as a Supreme Court judge on Friday, DY Chandrachud delivered an anti-climactic judgment that perhaps best summed up his legacy as chief justice of India: the majority verdict in the Aligarh Muslim University minority status case that he authored struck all the right notes of progressive Constitutional values but failed to effect any material changes.

A seven-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court had heard arguments in January and February over whether the Aligarh Muslim University should retain its status as a minority educational institution under Article 30 of the Constitution. This article grants religious and linguistic minority communities the right to establish and administer schools, colleges and universities.

The university was founded in 1875 by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College.

After a wait of nine months since the bench reserved its judgment, the court did not answer the question about whether the university could actually be considered a minority institution.

Instead, the majority judgment, written by Chandrachud and endorsed by Justices Sanjiv Khanna, JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, only outlined the legal and interpretative framework needed to assess when an educational institution qualifies for minority status under Article 30(1) of the Constitution.

Scroll had earlier this year reported on the roots of the legal tussle and on the arguments each side presented in court.

On Friday, Chandrachud overruled a 1967 judgement by a five-judge bench of the court that had held that the university was not covered by Article 30.

But on the absence of a definite ruling on the minority status of the university, a 2005 judgement of the Allahabad High Court will remain valid. The judgement had relied on the 1967 Supreme Court verdict to hold that the university was not a minority educational institution.

The majority verdict left the appeal against this 2005 Allahabad High Court judgement to be decided by a smaller bench of the court in the future on the basis of the framework outlined in their verdict.

The three judges on the bench – Justices Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and SC Sharma – delivered dissenting opinions.

They disagreed on the validity of the case by a two-judge bench of the court being referred to a seven-judge bench in 1981. Each held that the reference was impermissible.

Datta and Sharma also held that the Aligarh Muslim University was not a minority institution for the purposes of Article 30.

Scroll explains the bench’s 500-page decision and the four different judgements in it.

The roots of the dispute

The dispute revolves around the Aligarh Muslim University’s status as a minority educational institution, stemming from the 1967 Supreme Court decision and the 2005 High Court ruling.

Founded as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875. the institution became a university in 1920. Only Muslims could be members of the governing council. Though the institution catered mainly to Muslims, students from other religions could also enrol.

After Independence, Parliament passed amendments to the Aligarh Muslim University Act, 1920, under which institution acquired its present form. In 1951, the Muslim-only representation on the governing body, known as the court, was done away with. In 1965, the court was divested of its status as the university’s supreme governing body and its powers were distributed among several entities in the institution.

These changes were challenged for violating a minority community’s right to administer educational institutions under Article 30 of the Constitution.

In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled that the university was not a Muslim-run institution, though it acknowledged the community’s efforts in establishing it. In 1981, Parliament amended the act to state that the university was established by Muslims and aimed to promote their educational advancement.

In 2005, the Allahabad High Court struck down the university’s decision to reserve 50% of the seats in its postgraduate medical courses for Muslim students. The court said that under the 1967 Supreme Court ruling, the university was not deemed a minority institution.

This decision was challenged, leading Chandrachud to form a seven-judge bench in October last year to hear the case.

Majority verdict

On Friday, the majority judgement stated that the core question before the bench was to determine the criteria by which minority educational institutions could be recognised as such. Chandrachud noted that a formalistic approach that merely asking whether an institution was established by members of a minority group was insufficient. Instead, the analysis must consider the purpose and intent for its establishment and whether it was aimed at benefiting the minority community.

To qualify under Article 30(1), an institution must show that its founding was driven by a person or group from a minority community and that it had been set up primarily for the community’s benefit.

The chief justice’s interpretation emphasised that educational institutions predating the Constitution are also entitled to the protective provisions of Article 30(1). He said that the enactment of statutes to grant legal recognition or status to such institutions does not strip them of their minority character, provided that the founding purpose remains aligned with serving the minority’s interest.

He overturned the 1967 judgement that held that institutions established through legislative acts could not be considered minority institutions. Chandrachud reasoned that this approach would effectively be a denial of fundamental rights if legal formalities required for recognition or degree conferral nullified an institution’s minority status.

The majority judgement maintained that incorporation and regulation do not automatically negate an institution’s minority character. Regulatory measures for educational standards and public interest do not compel minority rights to be relinquished. It also clarified that the administrative structure of a minority institution does not need to be entirely composed of minority members but the founding vision and purpose must clearly reflect the community’s initiative and control.

Chandrachud laid out several indicators for assessing minority establishment: the origin of the idea, the primary purpose for founding the institution and the concrete steps taken by the minority group, such as funding or securing land. These criteria were designed to distinguish whether the impetus and support for the institution’s establishment came predominantly from a minority community.

The judgment recognised that an institution’s minority character is not static and that educational institutions serving diverse groups, providing secular education or admitting non-minorities could still qualify under Article 30.

The existence of religious symbols or places of worship was deemed non-essential for determining minority status. The verdict stressed that a comprehensive review of documents, correspondence and historical records was essential to identify the “brain” behind an institution’s creation.

Chandrachud handed over the question of Aligarh Muslim University’s minority status to a regular bench. As a result, a 2006 Supreme Court verdict staying the university’s 2005 reservation policy remains in place. The presumption that the university is not a minority institution, as held by the Allahabad High Court in 2005, will continue until the matter is decided otherwise later.

Kant’s dissent

Surya Kant mainly differed from Chandrachud on whether the decision to refer the matter to a seven-judge Constitution bench in 1981 was valid. He held that the court’s two-judge bench in 1981 could not have doubted the correctness of the five-judge bench decision from 1967, according to the court’s jurisprudence. He said that the reference was an improper challenge to the authority of the chief justice of India.

However, he largely agreed with Chandrachud in holding the 1967 judgement incorrect. Kant held that the 1967 decision mistakenly stated that the Aligarh Muslim University could not have been established by a private individual or society.

Kant held that minority institutions established before the Constitution are entitled to protection under Article 30. To do so, a minority institution must meet the criteria of being established and administered by the minority community.

The exact meaning of “establish” and “administer” under Article 30 will be determined by the courts on a case-to-case basis. Kant also agreed with the decision to refer to a regular bench the question of whether Aligarh Muslim University met the establishment and administration criteria of being a minority institution.

Datta’s dissent

Dipankar Datta, in addition to agreeing with Kant over the legal impermissibility of the reference, also held that the Aligarh Muslim University was not a minority institution. According to him, it was neither established nor administered by a minority community.

Datta held that the pre- and post-Constitutional context differs and any attempt to define the university’s status based on modern concepts may be flawed. A minority institution, established by a community, must also be administered by that community to qualify for Article 30 protection. The university’s establishment through statute, with limited minority control, complicated this analysis, he contended.

He held that the university, being a statutory entity, is subject to Constitutional provisions and government regulations. This limited the minority community’s control over its administration.

The case also highlighted the importance of balancing minority rights under Article 30 with substantive justice, Datta wrote, and ensuring that reservations for backward classes and communities are not overlooked in favour of minority rights.

Datta’s judgement is notable for two more reasons.

In a prologue, he stated that he faced significant delays in receiving the draft judgment in the case from Chandrachud. He only received the draft two days before the verdict was to be delivered. Due to this, Datta had to write his separate opinion in an extremely short time.

He mentioned that the lack of constructive discussions among the judges on the bench led to his predicament. Datta highlighted how limited coordination and time constraints made it difficult for him to prepare his judgment.

Such disclosure about such behind-the-scenes details is highly unusual.

Besides, in a thinly-veiled shot at Chandrachud’s verdict, Datta wrote that judges should not disregard long-standing judicial interpretations for judicial activism. They must be mindful of their limitations and guided by Constitutional morality.

Sharma’s dissent

SC Sharma agreed with Kant and Datta that the two-judge bench of the court lacked the authority to directly refer the matter to a larger bench without the chief justice’s involvement.

He also disagreed with Chandrachud on his interpretation of Article 30. For minority rights under Article 30, “establishment” by the minority is crucial and must involve complete control over the creation and administration of the institution, he said. Establishment under Article 30 requires the minority to lead all foundational efforts, including funding, building and staffing decisions.

The purpose of such institutions, he held, must primarily serve the minority’s interests. The administration should also be predominantly by the minority community, including policies and staff decisions, ensuring alignment with their ideas and beliefs.

According to Sharma, the Aligarh Muslim University’s historical background before 1950 and the absence of requirements for minority-only leadership after 1951 weaken the argument for exclusive control by the minority community.

Sharma also rejected the notion that minorities need “protected” spaces for education. “The institutions of national character of the country always serve the interests of the minorities and are diverse centers of learning,” he wrote.