Bangladesh: India has its work cut with geopolitical, economic and security challenges

As Bangladesh grapples with socio-political turmoil in the aftermath of August’s momentous developments – which saw former prime minister Sheikh Hasina fleeing the country after 15 years in charge, in response to widespread protests – the effects are being felt across its borders in India.

From losing a supposed ally in the ousted Awami League government to witnessing domestic protests against the alleged atrocities on Hindu minorities, India faces numerous challenges emerging from the evolving situation, none of which can easily be resolved.

In these circumstances, it has become critical for New Delhi to revisit its binary, Awami-League-versus-the-rest approach toward Bangladesh and make space for a nimble, multi-vector foreign policy.

Spillover effects

While Bangladesh has its hands full with the challenges of structural reforms and rebuilding democratic processes in the aftermath of a revolution, India has many tasks cut out for itself to control the geopolitical and geoeconomic damage that has accrued from the political upheaval in the country next door.

The ousting of the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government on August 5 was precipitated by a nationwide student agitation against the reinstating of a quota policy that reserved 30% of public sector jobs for the descendants of freedom fighters who fought for independence from Pakistan in 1971. To the protestors, this policy did little apart from favoring members of the ruling Awami League or those close to them, by giving them institutional preference and, hence, was considered to be discriminatory.

While the initial round of protests in July were largely peaceful, the government’s reported use of disproportionate force against the students and deliberate attempts to discredit the protestors by calling them “razakars” (“traitors” in the context of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation) transformed the student agitation into a nationwide movement against Hasina’s alleged heavy-handedness. As the security forces, chiefly the military, refused to take action against the protestors, it left Hasina and her government vulnerable, eventually forcing her to flee Bangladesh into India.

The public overthrow of the Hasina government, which was known to be close to India, has created ripple effects for Bangladesh’s neighbour in the west. To begin with, India lost a somewhat aligned partner in the South Asian region, which, in recent years, has been rife with anti-India sentiments.

India has constantly faced challenges to both its ideological and national security from direct threats, such as those posed by cross-border terrorism and extremism, as well as more strategic dilemmas emanating from the India-China rivalry in the region, as has been evident in the Maldives and Nepal. Against the backdrop of these larger geopolitical dynamics, the overthrow of a relatively secular, ostensibly democratic regime under Hasina has arguably turned the spotlight on the lacunae in India’s so-called “neighborhood first policy”, creating challenges for its regional policies as well as national security.

Despite differences, Dhaka remained an “effective enforcer of India’s security goals”, assisting New Delhi in clamping down on Islamic radicalism and insurgencies within its borders. Pending fresh elections, the prevailing political vacuum in Bangladesh – despite the presence of an interim government under the leadership of Mohammed Yunus – and the growing possibility of a dispensation that would be less sympathetic to India taking hold of the domestic and foreign matters in the country are very likely to affect New Delhi’s counter-terrorism capabilities.

Similarly, the overthrowing of the India-friendly Awami League has created more space for India’s regional rivals, namely China and Pakistan, to try and mould the political landscape in Bangladesh more to their liking. Decidedly, the influence of India on the Bangladeshi state-of-affairs has taken not only an ideological hit, but is also facing a deeper crisis, with reports of vandalism of the Indira Gandhi Cultural Center and complete lock-down of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka akin to what was witnessed in Kabul with the Taliban’s takeover in 2021.

On the geo-economic side of things, it will be unsurprising to see both the interim and future Bangladeshi governments continue diversifying the country’s economic partnerships beyond India. We are likely to see this pan out in two ways for New Delhi, one of which signals continuity with the Awami League – such as the recent outreach by the interim government to China for establishing solar farms – while the other may be mired in more prominent anti-India sentiments, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s call to boycott Indian products. In fact, the political turmoil in Bangladesh has exposed as many as 12 Fast-Moving Consumer Goods companies, including Marico, Godrej, and Dabur, to significant supply chain disruptions, threatening their stock prices and revenues.

At a more structural level, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party has called for the cancellation of all agreements signed with India during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, describing them as secret and unjust, while the interim government is considering scrapping those memorandum of understanding with India that it deems to be “non-beneficial” to Dhaka. This is unlikely to gain much traction because of Dhaka’s reliance on New Delhi for food supplies, cotton yarn, and energy, but the erosion of India’s economic clout in Bangladesh is likely to become the new normal.

Despite the swift reopening of land ports and efforts at re-normalising the trade ties between the two countries after the interim government took over, major connectivity projects like the Ashuganj-Akhaura four-lane highway have been abandoned mid-way due to the political turmoil in Bangladesh. It remains to be seen how quickly such projects will resume, if at all, for much of it depends on who comes to power in Dhaka and when.

In addition to raising structural concerns for New Delhi, the situation in Bangladesh has not left domestic politics in India untouched. In particular, the overthrow of a perceptibly more secular Hasina government and targeted violence and vandalism against members of the minority Hindu community, as well as their property and institutions, have generated both political concerns and civic reactions.

With more than 200 cases of violence reported against minorities from August 5-10 in Bangladesh, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself registered his government’s concern for the plight of the minority community during his Independence Day speech on August 15. At the same time, Indian interest groups, particularly those with right-wing leanings, have sought to mobilise over the issue of attacks on minorities in Bangladesh – from marching to the office of the Assistant High Commission of Bangladesh in Assam with a list of demands to holding demonstrations in Maharashtra and Tripura.

In fact, the situation in Bangladesh has even managed to insert itself into the provincial electoral discourse of India, reflecting the extent to which the crisis next door has captured the imagination of the social and political classes of the country. That said, such reactions in India are unlikely to go unnoticed in Bangladesh, which makes it all the more critical for the Indian establishment to adopt a more nuanced approach toward Bangladesh, especially with leaders in Dhaka actively requesting New Delhi to apply a more considered view.

A multi-vector approach

Indian foreign policy on Bangladesh has often been criticised for its myopic, binary approach, and in some ways, New Delhi seems to be paying a price for its over-reliance on the Awami League. Seemingly left friendless in the emerging scheme of things in Dhaka, the sentiments on the ground do not speak in favor of India, especially as New Delhi is seen as having abetted Hasina’s allegedly heavy-handed rule not once but thrice.

That the ousted Bangladeshi prime minister reportedly continues to find refuge in India may add to negative perceptions in Dhaka, making it harder for New Delhi to engage with the political forces that remain relevant in Bangladesh, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which is not typically known for being aligned to Indian ideology and interests.

Given the massive public and political outrage against the ousted Awami leader, her party, and her supposed benefactor (India), it will be in New Delhi’s interest to discard its hitherto followed either/or template and adopt a more nimble, multi-vector perspective on the complex situation in Bangladesh. This does not necessarily require a complete abandoning of its erstwhile allies in Dhaka, or its own interests. Instead, this approach signals the need for India’s bilateral policies to break out of its “Awami-vs-the-rest” echo chamber and broaden the canvas by diversifying New Delhi’s outreach to other entities to better understand the murmurs on the ground.

Chayanika Saxena is an embedded intelligence consultant in Big Tech. All views are personal.

This article was first published in India in Transition, a publication of the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.