Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League’s victory in the 1970 election came as a surprise to the intelligence services, leading [President] Yahya Khan to assume the role of an arbiter. However, hawkish figures in the Army remained sceptical of Sheikh Mujib, and Bhutto aligned himself with these hawks, even going so far as to threaten to harm party members who planned to attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly on 3 March 1971. During an interview, Bhutto suggested that the separation of East Pakistan might not be an entirely disastrous outcome, since the current state of Pakistan was already unwieldy. He argued that the only way to maintain unity would be to establish a loose constitutional arrangement, which could set a dangerous precedent for West Pakistan, where the Baluch may demand similar treatment. According to Bhutto, a smaller, more manageable and compact Pakistan might be preferable to the current situation.
The Awami League’s six-point proposal was a nightmare for Yahya Khan and his advisors. Despite this, they were determined to bring down Mujib and reach a compromise. Yahya and Bhutto made several trips to the East to persuade Mujib to work with them. However, every time Yahya seemed ready to recognise Mujib as the legitimate prime minister, he was dissuaded by his colleagues, who feared that Mujib might use his majority in the assembly to legally secede from Pakistan or diminish the Army’s power.
Meanwhile, the Army began bringing in new troops disguised as civilians on Pakistan International Airlines flights via Colombo, although the locals quickly noticed them. Fortunately for the military, Bhutto’s opposition to the six-point proposal provided a much-needed respite. As a result, Yahya postponed the National Assembly session scheduled for 1 March 1971, citing the absence of the largest political party from West Pakistan at the inaugural session. He claimed that the postponement would give the political leaders more time to work out a settlement, and he set a new date for the session on 25 March 1971. This decision triggered a massive uprising in East Pakistan, and a call for civil disobedience resulted in the complete closure of government offices, businesses, the High Court and banks, and brought transportation to a standstill.
As polarisation intensified, some hardline Awami Leaguers began calling for independence, and League leaders assumed control. The state’s authority had all but collapsed and reprisals were taken against Urdu-speakers and political opponents. Army officers were attacked and humiliated, and non-Bengali residents of East Pakistan found themselves under sporadic attack. Reports of these events circulated, causing fear and panic among West Pakistanis living in the region. The Army, despite facing insults and even suspension of their food supplies by Bengali contractors, maintained discipline and became alienated in their own country.
As Pakistan’s national day, 23 March, approached, Yahya and Bhutto were in Dhaka, but discussions with Mujib fell apart. Mujib’s forces hoisted the Bangladesh flag over most of East Pakistan, turning Pakistan Day into Resistance Day. The Army had a plan, and when talks failed, they launched Operation Searchlight on the night of 25 March. By 8 p.m. Mujib received news that soldiers of the East Pakistan Regiment (EPR) at Road Number 2 in Dhanmondi had been disarmed by their West Pakistani commanders.
He told Bengali journalists that he anticipated the Army’s movement that night and expressed concerns about “selective killing”. He decided to stay but advised other Awami League leaders to leave. Tajuddin left and eventually became the prime minister of the Bangladeshi government-in-exile in Calcutta. Yahya departed for West Pakistan that evening, leaving Bhutto behind in his hotel room.
The regime’s use of “full-scale military terror” was in defence of a unitary state and viceregal tradition, despite knowing that its utilization could ultimately lead to losing half the country. Rather than coming to terms with the democratic desires of the majority Bengali population, the government sought to dispel that population’s aspirations. The Awami League was proscribed as a political party and all the prominent leaders, including Mujib, were put behind bars.
The Pakistan Army had approximately 45,000 soldiers stationed in East Pakistan, including a brigade led by Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab in Dhaka. The Army crackdown began overnight, with a group of Special Services Group (SSG) commandos capturing Mujib, while other leaders were allowed to escape. The commandos destroyed the students’ dormitories at Dhaka University, which had been used to house militants who were trained in using armaments with mock weapons. The raid on Dhaka University has been a subject of controversy, with some accusing the Army of attacking unarmed students. However, the Indian American journalist Sarmila Bose contests this version and provides evidence from a recording of Army communications during the attack made by a Bengali and made available to her by the Liberation War Museum in Dhaka. The recording supports the Army’s version of a two-way battle but reveals that it was very unequal, with only .303 rifle fire from the student halls and no evidence of automatic weapons or grenades.
The Army’s actions during the crackdown included attacks on newspaper offices and printing presses, reportedly in retaliation for articles critical of the military. Bhutto witnessed the military operation for approximately three hours, during which he observed multiple fires and the destruction of The People newspaper’s office. This local English-language daily had published inflammatory and provocative articles against the Army and West Pakistan. As Bhutto looked out at the chaotic scene, he couldn’t help but reflect on the past and contemplate what the future held. Witnessing the death and destruction of his own people before his eyes was “heartbreaking”.
The Army swiftly took control of all key installations and broadcasting centres in Dhaka, but their efforts were thwarted in Chittagong where the 8th East Bengal Regiment (EBR) rebelled under the leadership of Major Ziaur Rehman, who took over the radio station and broadcasted messages for four days before an air attack destroyed the transmitter. Similar uprisings were witnessed all over the province, leading to firefights and the eventual departure of Bengali officers and soldiers to India. The regime made a crucial mistake by hastily sending foreign journalists in Dhaka away from the city, a decision ordered by Tikka Khan but supported by Roedad Khan, a hawkish civil servant who exercised strict control over the media as the secretary of the Ministry of Information.
As a result, most journalists covered the ensuing events from India. However, three journalists, Michel Laurent, Simon Dring and Arnold Zeitlin, remained in Dhaka and filed reports that were critical and vivid, exposing the military action taking place. Consequently, the propaganda war was already lost. Bhutto left for Karachi the next day and from there, uttered his “memorable” words: “Thank God, Pakistan has been saved.” In retrospect, Bhutto believed that the Awami League would have unilaterally declared the independence of Bangladesh if the regime had not acted the next day. However, in his account published in September 1971, Bhutto maintained his support for Army action while also criticizing the brutality of its execution. He believed that the Army should have acted quickly but not brutally, and that the rebels should have been ferreted out individually rather than through mass destruction, which aggravated the problem. Bhutto professed a desire to reinstate democratic governance, but he avoided addressing his own involvement in fuelling the inter-wing conflict that led to the military intervention. He relied on the Army to resolve the crisis and grant him a portion of power in the central government.
The most scathing criticism of the Army’s actions came from Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, who was appointed as the governor and MLA by Yahya after being promoted over many officers. Niazi had served in the region during the Second World War and had commanded the 5th Punjab Regiment in Dhaka in 1958. In his memoirs, published many years after the events, Niazi stated that General Tikka, who was tasked with disarming Bengali units and individuals and apprehending Bengali leaders, instead pursued a “scorched-earth” policy. According to Niazi, Tikka instructed his troops to “want the land and not the people”. In his diary, Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote that “the green land of East Pakistan will be painted red”.
Excerpted with permission from Chequered Past, Uncertain Future: The Story of Pakistan, Tahir Kamran, Speaking Tiger Books.
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